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Introduction
Over the past few decades, undeclared work has been recognised as persistent and not disappearing with economic development (Horodnic I.A. & Williams, 2018; ILO, 2013; La Porta & Shleifer, 2008, 2014). For example, one-third of businesses worldwide are estimated to start-up unregistered (Autio & Fu, 2015) and globally, one-half of all businesses are estimated to operate unregistered (Acs, Desai, Stenholm, & Wuebker, 2013). The share of businesses operating in the undeclared economy is higher if one takes into account the uncalculated proportion of registered businesses which under-report turnover, their number of employees or employees` wages (Williams, 2018). Besides the negative implications on governments which collect lower tax revenue for spending on public goods and services (Sauka, Schneider, & Williams, 2016), undeclared work also creates unfair competition for legitimate businesses (Ali & Najman, 2018; Dana, 2013). Indeed, recent research reveals that businesses witnessing high competition from those operating in the undeclared economy have lower annual sales growth (Williams & Bezeredi, 2018a) and lower productivity (Williams & Bezeredi, 2019) compared with those who do not face competition from informal competitors.  However, although it is common to assert that undeclared work is more widespread in services industries, such as the hospitality industry (Thomas, Shaw, & Stephen, 2011), no study has so far evaluated the impact of informal competitors on service sector businesses. Similarly, although tackling undeclared work is a core issue for not only national governments but also supra-national organisations (European Commission, 2016; ILO, 2015), there is so far no research on the policy measures which legitimate service sector businesses consider important for reducing undeclared work and little, if any, research on whether sector specific policy initiatives are required. 
	To fill these gaps, the aim of this paper is to evaluate the impact of informal competition on service sector businesses and to explore the policy measures considered effective by legitimate service industry businesses. 
	To achieve this, section 2 reviews the literature. This will reveal that despite the burgeoning literature on undeclared work, there has been little research on the impact of undeclared work on the service industries and what policy measures service businesses perceive would be effective in reducing such non-compliant behaviour. To address this, the third section reports the data, namely a survey conducted on a representative sample of 1,430 businesses in Bulgaria, Croatia and North Macedonia, which are three countries with among the highest rates of undeclared work in Europe. Section 4 then reports the results and finally, the fifth section explores the implications of the findings.
The impact of informal competition in the service sector and policy approaches

The widespread belief for many decades was that undeclared work would vanish with economic development and modernisation (Geertz, 1963; Packard, 2007). However, more recently, scholars have recognised its prevalence and persistence in not only developing countries but also developed ones (La Porta & Shleifer, 2008, 2014; Kedir, Williams & Altinay, 2018). As such, an emerging body of literature have investigated its prevalence and impacts. 
An International Labour Organisation (ILO) survey of 38 developing economies, for example, reveals that the percentage of the non-agricultural workforce having their main job in own-account work in the informal sector is about 25%, ranging from 7.7% in Europe and Central Asia to 32% in Sub-Saharan Africa. Marked variations across countries also exist, ranging from 3.5% in Serbia and 7% in Moldova to 73% in Pakistan (Williams, 2018). Other studies estimate that half of all global businesses operate unregistered (Acs et al., 2013) and this figure excludes those registered companies conducting some of their transactions undeclared. Meanwhile examining formal businesses with five or more employees, the finding is that across 142 countries (including 15 developed countries such as South Korea, Germany, Ireland), 19.9% of these enterprises started-up unregistered, varying from 5.5% in Europe and Central Asia and 7.9% in OECD countries to 43.2% in Sub-Saharan Africa and 46.9% in South Asia. This study also reveals that of all formal enterprises with five or more employees in the service industries, 21.7% started-up unregistered compared with 17% of manufacturing enterprises (Williams, 2018). This is perhaps not surprising considering that informal practices are widely considered more prevalent in service industries, such as the hospitality industry (Damayanti, Scott & Ruhanen, 2018; Thomas et al., 2011). 
What, therefore, is the impact of undeclared work on legitimate businesses? The overarching conclusion of the literature is that any positive impacts of informality (e.g., how the informal economy acts as a test-bed for start-ups) are far outweighed by the negative impacts on governments, the business environment, customers and informal entrepreneurs themselves. Governments lose tax revenue that could be spent on public goods and facilitating economic development and growth (Bajada & Schneider, 2005) and have less control over working conditions and whether the minimum quality requirements of the products and services is met (ILO, 2015). Meanwhile, formal businesses witness  unfair competition due to price and wage dumping from informal businesses (Friesen & Wacker, 2013; Gonzalez & Lamanna, 2007; Leal Ordóñez, 2014; Levy, 2008) and customers do not have any legal recourse when the service or the good they bought from an informal business do not meet the health and safety regulations (Williams & Martinez-Perez, 2014a, 2014b). Entrepreneurs operating undeclared are ‘unproductive’ and operate lower performing businesses (La Porta & Shleifer, 2008, 2014). However, there are some potentially positive aspects of informality, notably that entrepreneurs can test the viability of a business idea without firstly investing the time and money required for registration (Barbour & Llanes, 2013; Evans, Syrett, & Williams, 2006; Ketchen, Ireland, & Webb, 2014; Williams & Gurtoo, 2017; Williams & Martinez-Perez, 2014a, 2014b).
	Despite this dominant negative depiction of undeclared work, only a limited number of studies have so far analysed its impact on legitimate businesses and none have investigated the undeclared practices employed by businesses (i.e., under-reporting employees or under-reporting employees` wages). One notable exception is a cross-national study of 142 countries. This reveals that 41.9% of formal enterprises compete against unregistered or informal businesses, ranging from 20.5% in the OECD countries to 52.1% in Sub-Saharan Africa (Williams & Kedir, 2018). Furthermore, 26.9% of formal businesses consider that the informal competitors represent a major constraint to their business, ranging from 2.9% of formal businesses in the OECD countries to 36.6% in Latin American and Caribbean countries (Williams, 2018). However, these studies do not compare whether there is any difference across sectors and do not include the undeclared practices employed by the registered companies. For example, a business survey on informality in three European countries does not provide any information on its impact on the businesses. This is surprising considering the finding of the commonality of undeclared practices among businesses, namely: under-reporting employees` wages (39.3% of businesses in Latvia, 42.9% in Lithuania and 52.3% in Estonia); under-reporting business income (28.5% in Estonia, 39.5% in Lithuania and 42.7% in Latvia) and under-reporting the number of employees (17.6% in Lithuania, 18% in Latvia and 19.2% in Estonia) (Putniņš & Sauka, 2015). Meanwhile, th few studies that analyse the impact of undeclared work in context tend to be limited to studies of individual sectors such as hospitality (Williams & Horodnic I.A., 2017a) or manufacturing (Gonzalez & Lamanna, 2007) or cover only one country (Ali, 2014; Ali & Najman, 2018). 
As such, this paper aims to address these shortcomings firstly by analysing the impact of informal competition on enterprises and comparing it with other obstacles that legitimate businesses face, and secondly, by including a cross-national and cross-sectoral comparison. 
Turning to policy measures for tackling undeclared work, a burgeoning literature has investigated the measures for reducing the participation of citizens in various forms of undeclared work (see for example, Horodnic I.A. & Williams, 2019; Williams & Horodnic I.A., 2015, 2017b), and the drivers underpinning entrepreneurship in the undeclared economy in order to identify the most effective measures for reducing it (Kus, 2014; OECD, 2015; Polese, 2014; Williams, 2018). Both streams of literature display that the policy measures dominantly used by governments are those related with a ‘rational economic actor’ approach. According to this view, individuals engage in undeclared practices as long as the benefits of such activities are higher than the costs of being detected and fined (Allingham & Sandmo, 1972). This view has been widely adopted by governments who seek to eradicate non-compliant behaviour by altering the cost/benefit ratio by increasing the actual or the perceived costs of engaging in this type of behaviour (i.e., increasing the risk of detection and sanctions) (Grabiner, 2000; Richardson & Sawyer, 2001). 
However, over the past decade, the validity of this approach has started to be questioned in terms of its effectiveness and the need to increase employment participation rates and thus, to transform undeclared work into declared work rather than to eradicate it. Increasing deterrents has been revealed to be effective in some studies (e.g., Kluge & Libman, 2017; Mazzolini, Pagani, & Santoro, 2017; Slemrod, Blumenthal, & Christian, 2001), to have no effect in other studies (e.g., Hartl, Hofmann, Gangl, Hartner-Tiefenthaler, & Kirchler, 2015; Shaw, Slemrod, & Whiting, 2008; Williams & Franic, 2015, 2016) and have the opposite effect to that desired in yet others, resulting in increasing participation in undeclared work due to the breakdown of trust between citizens and government (e.g., Hofmann, Hartl, Gangl, Hartner-Tiefenthaler, & Kirchler, 2017; Kaplanoglu, Rapanos, & Daskalakis, 2016; Murphy, 2008). 
A deterrence approach also fails to transform to undeclared work into declared work. This is important if employment participation rates are to be improved. For example, in the European Union in 2017, only 72.1% of the working age population (aged between 20 years old and 64 years old) were in employment (Williams & Horodnic I.A., 2019). Therefore, many supranational bodies call on governments to transform undeclared work into declared work rather than simply eradicate it (European Commission, 2007; ILO, 2015). As such, the call is to complement the repressive measures based on deterrents with measures that enable the transformation of undeclared work into declared work. Three categories of such policy measures exist (Williams & Renooy, 2009), namely: i) preventive measures which focus on preventing the occurrence of informal practices, ii) curative measures which focuses on helping those non-compliant to move to formal economy and iii) commitment measures aiming at increasing the citizens` and entrepreneurs` tax morality by fostering trust, both at the horizontal level (between citizens or between entrepreneurs) and vertical level (between citizens and entrepreneurs and the government).  Although little research has been conducted that investigates simultaneously the effectiveness of all types of measure, studies comparing citizens’ views of deterrent and commitment measures reveal that commitment measures are more effective than deterrence measures at changing citizen behaviour (e.g., Dube, 2018; Horodnic 2018; Kaplanoglou et al., 2016; Littlewood, Rodgers & Yang, 2018; Williams & Horodnic I.A., 2016, 2019; Williams & Bezeredi, 2018b).  
However, little attention has been given to business perspectives on what is considered necessary for tackling the undeclared work of their competitors. This is surprising given the level of knowledge of entrepreneurs and managers of their business environment and their competitors. This paper will fill this gap by analysing not only the view of businesses on how undeclared work can be tackled but also by providing a comparative analysis by country and by service sector industry to enable tailored policy recommendations. Furthermore, the paper provides a comparative analysis of the four categories of policy measure from the perspective of business.
Data 
To identify policy measures to reduce undeclared work in the service sector, we here analyse employers` views on what is required to tackle undeclared work. The results of a representative employers’ survey conducted in three South-Eastern European countries with among the highest levels of undeclared work in Europe (Medina and Schneider, 2018) are here reported. This survey, conducted between August and October 2015, interviewed some 1,430 businesses in Bulgaria, Croatia and North Macedonia during 2015 on a face-to-face basis, with some 500 conducted in Croatia and 450 in Bulgaria and North Macedonia. The stratified random sampling methodology ensured that on the issues of size, region and sector, the samples are proportionate to the universe for each country. The survey results indicate good reliability of the interviews; 94.0% of interviewers reporting excellent or fair cooperation from the employers, compared to 4.9% reporting average and 0.2% bad cooperation. A further 0.9% of the interviewers did not assess the perceived reliability of the interviews.

Methodological approach
To evaluate policy measures to tackle undeclared work in the service sector, we here use univariate and multivariate analysis. We firstly analyse the obstacles faced by legitimate businesses, the sectors more affected by businesses performing undeclared work as well as various types of undeclared work (e.g., working with no contract, envelope wages) in a comparative approach between the service sector and other sectors.
Secondly, to evaluate the type of businesses in the service sector likely to be affected by other businesses performing undeclared work, we here use logistic regression analysis. Of 1,430 surveyed businesses, we focus the analysis on 1,130 interviews conducted with businesses in service sector. The dependent variable in our model is a dummy variable with value 1 for those service sector businesses stating that they are affected by other businesses performing undeclared work and value 0 otherwise. This is based on their answer to the question: ‘Is your business affected by the existence of others who are doing informal work?’. Various control variables are used according to previous studies competition with those operating in the undeclared economy (Ali & Najman, 2018; Williams, Martinez-Perez, & Kedir, 2017), entrepreneurship in the informal sector (Farooq et al., 2019; Horodnic I.A. & Williams, 2018; Khan & Quaddus, 2015; Putniņš, Sauka, & Davidescu, 2018) or undeclared work (Horodnic I.A. & Williams, 2019; Horodnic A.V. & Williams, 2018; Horodnic, Mazilu, & Oprea, 2018; Karabchuk & Zabirova, 2018; Kedir and Rodgers, 2018; Williams & Horodnic A.V., 2017, 2018a, 2018b, 2019; Williams & Horodnic I.A., 2015, 2016, 2018; Windebank & Martinez-Perez, 2018). These are grouped in three categories, namely business characteristics (service sector, business size – no. of employees, business age, main activity (locality size), VAT registered), respondent characteristics (owner/manager, gender, age) and country characteristics (country) as detailed in Table A1 in the Appendix. An additive model is used (by firstly examining the business-level characteristics and then integrating respondent and country-level characteristics) as well as multiple imputation of the missing values to check the robustness of the findings. The number of imputed missing values can be consulted in Table A2 in the Appendix. To help interpret the findings, predicted probabilities of a ‘representative’ business in the service sector in Bulgaria, Croatia and North Macedonia to be affected by undeclared work are graphically displayed, by the business characteristics identified as significant in the multivariate analysis. 
Thirdly, after having identified the businesses in service sector more likely to be affected by other businesses performing undeclared work, we analyse the policy measures supported by employers affected by undeclared work compared with those considering they are not affected. Each category of policy measure, namely repressive, preventative, curative and commitment measures, is analysed in turn by the business characteristics found to be significant in the multivariate analysis and by country. This enables evidence-based policy measures to be identified to tackle undeclared work. Below, we report the findings.
Findings
Of the 1,430 interviews conducted with businesses in 2015 in Bulgaria, Croatia and North Macedonia, 1,130 businesses were interviewed in the service sector. Some 84.6% of the companies interviewed are micro businesses with less than nine employees (85.9% in Bulgaria, 79.5% in Croatia and 89.3% in North Macedonia). In terms of sectors, the most prevalent sector in the sample is represented by “trade” (23.7%), representing 26.4% in Bulgaria, 22.4% in Croatia and 22.5% in North Macedonia. According to Table 1, almost one third (27.7%) of the businesses in the service sector consider illegal competition a very severe obstacle to their current operations. Therefore, in this sector, it is illegal competition that is cited most frequently as a very severe obstacle faced by businesses, followed by corruption (23.7%). It is similarly the case when analysing the agriculture, forestry and fishing sector as well as the industry sector (except construction). In the construction sector, among obstacles faced by businesses, the most cited very severe obstacle was corruption (29.8%), followed by illegal competition (29.5%). Indeed, compared with other obstacles faced by businesses, illegal competition (comprising all informal practices) is an important issue and the most cited severe obstacle by employers not only in the service sector but also in other sectors.

[INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE]

Focusing on businesses affected by competitors performing undeclared work, Table 2 reveals that 55.3% of businesses in Bulgaria, Croatia and North Macedonia are affected by informal competitors, with 68.2% of those businesses being affected significantly or very significantly. Nevertheless, as Table 2 displays, the phenomenon is not evenly distributed across countries. The share of businesses affected by competitors performing undeclared work is larger in Croatia (64.9%) and lower in North Macedonia (54.2%) and Bulgaria (44.1%). 
Similarly, Table 2 reveals variations across sectors. For instance, 54.5% of service sector businesses are affected by competitors performing undeclared work, with 67.0% of those businesses being affected significantly or very significantly. With 66.4% of businesses considering that they are affected by competitors operating in the undeclared economy, only construction sector seems to be more affected than the service sector. 
Analysing undeclared work across different service industries, Table 2 reveals that businesses are more affected by undeclared work in the information technology sector (77.3%), transport and communications (68.9%), trade (59.4%) and less affected in health (35.9%) and education (41.2%). However, analysing the severity of the impact of undeclared work on their businesses, it seems that for most of the service industries more than a half of the affected businesses asserted that they are affected significantly or very significantly by competitors performing undeclared work. A different pattern is observed in the information technology sector where, even if 77.3% of businesses are affected by informal competitors, only 47.0% assert being affected significantly or very significantly.

[INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE]

Turning to the types of undeclared work performed by competitors, Figure 1 provides an investigation of the most common undeclared practices. Two types of undeclared work are analysed, namely: working with no contract and paying envelope wages (i.e., a formal salary and an additional undeclared wage to employees). Overall, their prevalence is perceived as high across all sectors, with 18-30% being engaged in such practices. In line with previous studies, nevertheless, working without contract is more common in agriculture, forestry and fishing (28.9%) and construction (26.7%). In the service sector, the percent of those working with no contract is perceived as fairly high (18.9%). Analysing the prevalence of this practice across service industries, the finding is that working with no contract is more common in hotels and restaurants (24.9%) and transport and communication (21.8%).
Similarly, envelope wages are more common in agriculture, forestry and fishing (30.2%) and construction (28.2%). In the service sector 23% of employers pay envelope wages, with 24.9% of salary being paid as envelope wage. Figure 1 also reveals that the prevalence of envelope wages varies across service sectors from 11.2% in education to 24.7% in hotels and restaurants, 24.9% in transport and communications and 25.0% in information technology sector. Indeed, information technology, transport and communications and hotels and restaurants have higher degrees of underreporting, with 31.9%, 26.3% and 26.8% of salary being paid as an envelope wage.

[INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE]

To further analyse the characteristics of businesses in service sector more likely to be affected by businesses performing undeclared work, we here use logistic regression analysis and an additive model approach. The first stage specification examines the business characteristics while the second and third stage specifications add variables related to the respondent and country. Table 3 reports the results. Model 1 in Table 3 reveals that those in transport and communication, trade and information technology sectors are more likely to perceive that their business is affected by other businesses performing undeclared work compared with those in the hotels and restaurants sector. Meanwhile, no significant association was identified with respect to business size and age, business locality or whether the company is a VAT payer. 
When Model 2 includes respondent variables, there are no changes in the business characteristics associated with the likelihood to be affected by undeclared competitors. However, female respondents are more likely to perceive that their business is affected by other businesses performing undeclared work. No significant association is identified, moreover, in relation to the age of the respondent, or whether the respondent is the owner or the manager of that business. When country variable is included in Model 3, the significance of information technology sector reduced and therefore, the results for this service industry need to be cautiously interpreted. Indeed, businesses in the service sector in Croatia are more likely to be affected by other businesses performing undeclared activities. Similar findings are obtained when comparing the results of using crude data (Table 3) with those using imputed data (Table A3 in the Appendix), underlying the robustness of the findings. 

[INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE]

To graphically display the relationship between the impact of informal competitors and service industries, Figure 2 displays the predicted probabilities of a ‘representative’ business in the investigated countries to be affected by other businesses performing undeclared work. This ‘representative’ business is obtained using the modal values of the remaining explanatory variables in the regression analysis (details in Table A1 in the Appendix). As such, Figure 2 reveals that the probability that this ‘representative’ business would be affected by other businesses performing undeclared work is higher in transport and communications, information technology and trade.

[INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE]

These findings therefore provide a clear indication of the service industries more affected by competitors performing undeclared work in terms of the type of service industry and country. 
What policy measures, therefore, are supported by service sector businesses? Are these supported policy measures different across countries, the type of service industry and whether the businesses perceive competitors undertaking undeclared work as affecting them? To answer these questions, Table 4 examines the share of service businesses supporting repressive, preventative, curative and commitment policy measures. Marked in dark grey are the top three supported policy measures by service sector businesses. 

[INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE]

Table 4 reveals that regardless of whether a service sector business is affected by competitors undertaking undeclared work, the most effective measures to tackle undeclared work are perceived to be: 1) to make it easier to legitimately hire workers on small or occasional jobs; 2) to reduce the entitlements of non-compliant businesses in terms of banning them from participating in public tenders and receiving subsidies; and 3) to simplify and consolidate several tax liabilities of micro- and small firms into one fixed payment. Similar findings are obtained when analyzing the most effective measures across countries. However, the differences are that businesses in North Macedonia would consider most effective only preventative measures and businesses in Croatia would consider as well measures to ensure a sense of fairness in how firms are treated by the tax authorities. 
	However, there are some differences regarding the most effective three policy measures across the service industries. For instance, enforcing stricter sanctions was ranked in the top three most effective measures by businesses in transport and communications and information technology, while simpler administrative procedures for paying taxes and social security contributions were included by businesses in the hotels and restaurants sector, education and professional, real estate, arts and entertainment, and administrative and support services. Moreover, creating ‘white lists’ of compliant firms was included by service businesses in transport and communications and retail, while measures to ensure a sense of fairness in how firms are treated by the tax authorities are included by businesses in education, health and other service activities.
Discussion and conclusions
This analysis of 1,130 service sector businesses conducted in 2015 in Bulgaria, Croatia and North Macedonia reveals that competitors performing undeclared work are perceived as a major problem for legitimate businesses. Indeed, illegal competition is the most cited severe obstacle by business not only in the service sector but also other sectors, except the construction sector where illegal competition is ranked second after corruption. Narrowing the analysis to undeclared work, the results display its impact on legitimate businesses. Some 55.3% of businesses are affected by undeclared work undertaken by competitors, with 68.2% of the businesses being affected asserting that the impact is significant or very significant. Turning to the facets of undeclared work, businesses perceive that the share of employees having no contract varies from 18.9% in the service sector to 28.9% in agriculture, forestry and fishing, while the share having under-reported wages (i.e., envelope wages) varies from 22% in industry to 30.2% in agriculture, forestry and fishing and that the amount of wage which is undeclared varies from about 23.3% in industry to 30.9% in construction sector. 
Examining the type of business more affected by competitors undertaking undeclared work, the results of the multivariate analysis show that all businesses in service sector are rather equally affected (regardless of size, business age, whether VAT registered or type of area where the main activity takes place), with the only significant differences being across the type of service industry. Compared with hotels and restaurants, those in transport and communication, trade and information technology are significantly more likely to perceive that their business is affected by competitors performing undeclared work. 
How therefore, can undeclared work be tackled according to businesses? Analysing their views, the results support the use of preventive measures, underlining the need to make it easier for businesses to legitimately hire workers on small or occasional jobs and to simplify and consolidate several tax liabilities in micro- and small firms into one fixed payment. Another measure which is supported by businesses is reducing the entitlements of non-compliant businesses to participate in public tenders and receive subsidies if they employ undeclared workers or under-report salaries. These views are similar when analysing those asserting that they are affected by undeclared work undertaken by competitors and those who are not, across the countries and sectors. The only difference is observed in two sectors, namely transport and communications and information technology, where businesses rank in the top three most effective measures the need to enforce stricter sanctions, and therefore targeted inspections to these sectors could be effective. This result is not surprising considering that in these two sectors, previous studies reveal the existence of high levels of bogus self-employment and posted workers in the transport services (Bengtsson, 2016; Eurofound, 2016; Heyes & Hastings, 2017; Thörnquist, 2013) and problems with undeclared work in the on-line platform economy in information technology services (EU-OSHA, 2017; ILO, 2016). 
These results show that different sectors require varying policy approaches. Considering the views of businesses in the transport sector, for example, a measure perceived as highly effective is to create ‘white lists’ of compliant firms, which might be important for these businesses when they compete for contracts on freight exchange. However, in none of the sectors is stricter penalties viewed as the top preferred and effective measure for tackling undeclared work. Instead, there is more support for preventive and curative measures rather than harassing noncompliant businesses with penalties and inspections. It is important to note, moreover, that deterrents are not supported even by the businesses affected by competitors operating in the undeclared economy. 
This view of businesses not to use deterrent measures is supported by evidence-based evaluations of their effectiveness. The Eurobarometer surveys conducted in 2017 and 2013 show that the association between participation in undeclared work and tax morality (i.e., commitment policy measures) had become stronger in 2013 and has a greater marginal effect on the likelihood of participation than the perceived level of deterrents (i.e., sanctions and risk of detection) (Horodnic I.A. & Williams, 2019). However, at present, the views of national governments differ to the views of citizens and businesses. Two surveys of senior government officials in the EU involved in tackling undeclared work, conducted in 2010 and 2017, display that deterrents (i.e., risk of detection and penalties) are the most commonly used policy measure, that they are seen as the most effective policy instrument, and that the importance attributed to deterrents has increased over time, despite no ex-ante and ex-post evaluation of their effectiveness relative to other measures (Williams, Windebank, Baric, & Nadin, 2013; Williams & Puts, 2017). Therefore, government officials’ views on what is most effective to tackle undeclared work does not reflect the views of citizens and businesses on what influences their behaviour. However, the shortcoming of these surveys is that they do not allow any assessment of causal inferences. Therefore, further studies and experiments to investigate the causal relationships between different policy initiatives and participation in undeclared work of both employers and employees as well as own-account workers would be useful. This would enable more targeted policy measures for tackling different types of undeclared work.
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Table 1. Obstacles faced by businesses in Bulgaria, Croatia and North Macedonia, by sector (% very severe obstacle; N = 1,430)











Business licensing and permits	10.3	10	11.8	9	12.0	10	9.8	10
Courts	7.7	11	12.7	7	8.9	12	8.9	11
Work of local/central administration office	12.2	7	9.6	11	12.1	9	8.7	12
Rules/Procedures when establishing a firm	4.7	13	7.3	13	4.8	13	4.4	13
Notes: Don`t know / Refusal excluded





Table 2. Businesses affected by competitors performing undeclared work, by country and sector (%; N = 1,329)
	Businesses affected by competitors performing undeclared work	Business affected:



















Professional, real estate, arts and entertainment, administrative and support	45.5	30.8	44.6	16.9	7.7	0
Other service activities	54.2	16.8	50.4	23.9	8.0	0.9
Notes: *Don`t know / Refusal excluded




Figure 1. Type of informal work in Bulgaria, Croatia and North Macedonia, by sector
Notes: *Don`t know / Refusal excluded; N = 1,175 (no contract); 1,127 (envelope wages); 1,182 (degree of underreporting)







Table 3. Logit regression of the likelihood of businesses in service sector perceiving their business affected by competitors performing undeclared work
		Model 1		Model 2		Model 3
Variables				se()	Exp()				se()	Exp()				se()	Exp()
BUSINESS VARIABLES														







Professional, real estate, arts and entertainment, administrative and support	0.103		0.287	1.108		0.058		0.290	1.059		-0.002		0.295	0.998
Other service activities		0.430		0.269	1.538		0.380		0.272	1.463		0.170		0.286	1.185
Business size – no. of employees (sole proprietor, no waged employees)						
Micro (1–9)		-0.304		0.309	0.738		-0.325		0.315	0.723		-0.320		0.324	0.726
Small (10–49)		-0.338		0.388	0.713		-0.329		0.396	0.719		-0.460		0.406	0.631
Medium and Large (50+)	-0.582		0.581	0.559		-0.638		0.591	0.528		-0.657		0.597	0.518




More than 20 years		0.302		0.412	1.352		0.410		0.418	1.507		0.401		0.424	1.494
Main activity in (Village or rural area)												
Small town		0.464		0.413	1.591		0.461		0.415	1.585		0.381		0.420	1.464
Big city / The capital		0.060		0.393	1.062		0.055		0.395	1.057		0.238		0.401	1.269
The entire country		0.537		0.477	1.711		0.514		0.480	1.672		0.722		0.489	2.059





















Notes: Significant at *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Source: own calculations based on 2015 GREY data


Figure 2. Predicted probability of a representative businesses in service sector perceiving their business affected by competitors performing undeclared work: by type of service
Notes: *Hotels and restaurants; **Transport and Communications; ***Professional, real estate, arts and entertainment, administrative and support










Table 4. Policy measures to reduce undeclared work in service sector (% of businesses agreeing the policy measure; N = 1,130)  
Policy measure	All SERVICES	Affected1):	Country2):	Service sector3):
		Yes	No	BG	CR	MK	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I
REPRESSIVE MEASURES																													
Firms that employ undeclared workers, under-report salaries banned 	83.8	84.0	83.6	91.5	83.5	74.3	69.5	80.5	89.8	81.0	79.2	61.1	80.8	87.0	86.6
 from participating in public tenders and receiving subsidies																														
Enforcing stricter sanctions for firms engaged in undeclared work	73.4	71.0	74.6	83.5	68.9	63.5	64.4	80.9	70.2	65.8	83.3	68.4	68.6	82.6	78.0
																														
Publicly exposing (stigmatising) concrete examples of undeclared work	63.7	61.4	64.9	78.1	54.3	56.6	53.6	67.1	70.2	60.9	65.2	41.2	69.4	62.9	61.9
																														
PREVENTATIVE MEASURES																														
Making it easier to legitimately hire workers on small or occasional jobs	83.1	80.6	84.7	86.4	83.0	78.7	80.2	86.8	83.5	75.7	87.5	83.3	82.0	86.0	85.8
																														
Simplifying and consolidating several tax liabilities of micro- and small firms into one fixed payment	80.2	79.1	81.1	88.2	75.8	75.7	79.5	78.6	82.9	76.3	79.2	76.5	74.0	83.2	80.7
																														
Simpler administrative procedures for paying taxes and social security contributions	77.4	75.3	78.3	83.5	71.7	74.3	77.3	74.4	78.6	67.8	75.0	83.3	69.4	85.9	80.8
																														
CURATIVE MEASURES																														
Creating a “white list” of compliant firms which would be entitled to preferential administrative services (faster VAT refunds, advice, etc.)	77.1	76.0	76.8	85.1	72.4	69.0	70.2	81.2	78.7	77.8	70.8	60.0	72.5	83.7	74.4
																														
Specialised support (advice) for those entrepreneurs who are considering moving from undeclared to formal work	73.3	70.3	76.2	81.8	65.8	69.1	69.5	79.3	73.9	69.3	75.0	61.1	74.5	79.9	71.1
																														
MEASURES FOSTERING COMMITMENT																													
Ensuring a sense of fairness in how firms are treated by the tax authorities	78.6	76.0	80.2	82.3	78.5	71.9	74.4	77.3	77.7	72.4	73.9	88.2	76.0	83.1	83.9
																														
Raising awareness campaigns of the negative consequences of operating unregistered (e.g. constrained access to finance, limited growth prospect)	66.7	65.7	67.3	79.4	53.7	64.5	59.5	72.4	71.7	65.0	62.5	55.6	71.7	69.1	61.6
																														
																														
Notes: Don`t know / Refusal excluded; 1) Businesses affected by competitors performing undeclared work; 2) BG – Bulgaria, CR – Croatia, MK – North Macedonia; 3) A – Hotels and restaurants; B – Transport and communications; C – Trade; D – Retail; E – Information technology (IT); F – Education; G – Health; H – Professional, Real estate, Arts and entertainment, Administrative and support; I – Other service activities








Tab A1. Sample: descriptive statistic (N = 1,130)
Variable	Description	Mode
Dependent variable		
Business affected by competitors performing undeclared work	0 – No; 1 – Yes	Yes (54.5%)
Independent variables		
Business variables	Service sector	1 – Hotels  and restaurants; 2 – Transport  and Communications; 3 – Trade; 4 – Retail; 5 – Information technology (IT); 6 – Education; 7 – Health; 8 – Professional, real estate, arts and entertainment, administrative and support; 9 – Other service activities	Trade (23.7%)
	Business size – no. of employees	1 – sole proprietor, no waged employees; 2 – Micro (1–9 employees); 3 – Small (10–49 employees); 4 – Medium and Large (50+ employees)	Micro: 1–9 employees (84.6%)
	Business age	1 – less than 1 year; 2 – 1–5 years; 3 – 6–10 years; 4 – 11–20 years; 5 – More than 20 years	11–20 years (29.6%)
	Main activity in (locality size)	1 – Village or rural area; 2 – Small town; 3 – Big city / The capital; 4 – The entire country; 5 – Inside and/or outside the country	Big city / The capital (67.3%)
	VAT registered	0 – No; 1 – Yes 	Yes (74.8%)
Respondent variables	Owner/Manager	0 – No; 1 – Yes	Yes (69.6%)
	Female	0 – Male; 1 – Female	Female (50.2%)
	Age	1 – 18–24 years; 2 – 25–34 years; 3 – 35–44 years; 4 – 45–54 years; 5 – 55–64 years; 6 – 64+ years	35–44 years (32.1%)
Country	Country	1 – Croatia; 2 – Bulgaria; 3 – North Macedonia	Croatia (36.7%)









Tab A2. Missing data 
Variable	Number of cases:
	Complete	Imputed	Total
Dependent variable	Business affected by competitors performing undeclared work	1,046	84	1,130
Business variables	Service sector	1,130	0	1,130
	Business size – no. of employees	1,130	0	1,130
	Business age	1,121	9	1,130













Table A3. Logit regression of the likelihood of businesses in service sector perceiving their business affected by competitors performing undeclared work - imputed data
		Model 1		Model 2		Model 3
Variables				se()	Exp()				se()	Exp()				se()	Exp()
BUSINESS VARIABLES														







Professional, real estate, arts and entertainment, administrative and support	-0.013		0.279	0.987		-0.055		0.282	0.947		-0.100		0.287	0.905
Other service activities		0.304		0.265	1.356		0.252		0.268	1.287		0.033		0.282	1.034
Business size – no. of employees (sole proprietor, no waged employees)						
Micro (1–9)		-0.304		0.315	0.738		-0.327		0.321	0.721		-0.314		0.332	0.730
Small (10–49)		-0.343		0.391	0.709		-0.356		0.399	0.700		-0.481		0.411	0.618
Medium and Large (50+)		-0.685		0.579	0.504		-0.737		0.587	0.478		-0.721		0.597	0.486




More than 20 years		0.315		0.416	1.370		0.425		0.423	1.529		0.442		0.430	1.555
Main activity in (Village or rural area)												
Small town		0.563		0.405	1.756		0.557		0.408	1.746		0.433		0.414	1.542
Big city / The capital		0.102		0.392	1.107		0.100		0.394	1.106		0.218		0.401	1.244
The entire country		0.611		0.470	1.843		0.584		0.474	1.794		0.737		0.484	2.089




















Notes: Significant at *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Source: own calculations based on 2015 GREY data


Table A4. GDP and service sector (2015 and 2018)
	Bulgaria	Croatia	North Macedonia
	2015	20181)	2015	20181)	2015	20181)
GDP in U.S. dollars (billions) IMF, World Economic Outlook Database	50.20	65.20	49.52	60.81	10.07	12.67
GDP by sector (% of service sector)CIA, The World Factbook	67.2	67.4	69.5	70.1	62.7	62.5
Services, value added (% of GDP) WB, World Development Indicators	58.2	59.2	57.8	58.0	53.7	55.1
Note: 1) 2017 est. for GDP composition by sector
Source: CIA (2019), IMF (2019), World Bank (2019)

Table A5. Business demography and sample size by country and sector (2015)
	Bulgaria	Croatia	North Macedonia
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
Business demography (active enterprises)EUROSTAT, Structural Business Statistics						




Sample size2015 GREY data						
All NACE activities	456	--	521	--	453	--




Notes: 1) Except Agriculture due to lack of data in EUROSTAT database; 
Source: own calculations based on EUROSTAT (2019) and 2015 GREY data






